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Reaganfederalism, unlike Reaganomics, has achievedfar less than was anticipated in
1981. In this article, the extent ofreal change in the intergovernmental system is gauged by
assessing recent intergovernmental developments in light ofthe time perspective (1980,
1981, and 1987); the relative significance offederalism within the cluster ofReagan politi-
calprecepts; the interplay ofkey actors in the nationalpolicy process; and the views of
state and local officials. Also highlighted are the reasons that national policy activism has
been reduced but not rolled back. Overall, contemporary U. S. federalism is stillfound to
be a nation-centered one because ofthe strong centralizing currents in thejudicial/regula-
tory andpolitical/representational arenas. Yet it is also a somewhat less centripetal one
now than it was in 1980, owing to developments in the intergovernmentalJunctional, fis-
cal, and managerial spheres.
Have Reagan federalism and the recent massive federal budget deficits fundamen-
tally changed the heavily centralized system of U.S. intergovernmental relations
that emerged from 1964 to 1980? Before this pivotal question is answered, a brief expla-
nation of the core tenets of Reagan federalism and the historical context that helped shape
them is in order. Six separate objectives combine to constitute the Reagan federalism.
Most of these have been and are explicit administration goals. A couple, however (items 4
and 5), are more implicit and have to be inferred from policy proposals and actions.
1
.
A drastic reduction in the national intergovernmental role clearly is at the
center of Reagan's theory of federalism, and central to this is the need to
reduce the number of and dollars for federal grants-in-aid.
2. Clearly related to the above is a belief in the need for a devolution of many
federal program responsibilities to state and local governments (and the
sometimes cited concomitant requirement to devolve the needed financial
resources); in 1982, this basic goal was modified by the president's State of
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the Union "sorting out" proposal and its call for a federalization of Medi-
caid, which tacitly conceded the need for a simultaneous process involving
centralization and devolution. 1
3. Deregulation was and is a third component theme in Reagan federalism;
this involves curbing federal regulation of both the private sector and state
and local governments.
4. A return to the traditional dualistic partnership involving the states and the
national government was and is a clear, though less trumpeted, feature of
the president's federalism.
5. A determined effort to abandon federal participation in multistate and
substate regional institutions and programs (deinstitutionalization) is a less
heralded but persistent objective of the administration.
6. Finally, Reagan federalism in its broadest strokes calls for a reduction in
the expansionist activities of all governments, not just the national.
These goals, in effect, amount to a rejection of the rapidly centralizing course of U.S.
federalism that began in 1964 and lasted to 1978-80. During this period, the net growth
(after mergers and block grant consolidations) in the number of funded grant programs
amounted to at least 300, with a total of 537 as of the end of 1980 2 ; in dollar terms, aid
outlays experienced a greater than ninefold increase (and a doubling in constant dollars
during the seventies). The traditional federal-state partnership approach was significantly
altered to include federal-local, federal-nonprofit, and federal-state-local as well. The
percentage relationship of federal aid to state and local receipts from own sources rose
from 17.9 percent in 1964 to 30.7 percent by 1980.
Programmatically, significant expansions occurred in such broad functional areas as
health, social services, education, manpower, and community and regional development,
while the programs for natural resources, agriculture, and especially transportation aid
experienced proportionate declines. In terms of the scope of national policy concerns, a
wide range of governmental functions were included that previously were considered to
be of state, local, or even private concern (libraries, fire protection, policemen's pensions,
bikeways, rat control, potholes, and the like). In addition, a new era of "social regula-
tion" was ushered in during these years, with historic enactments in the areas of equal
rights and access, the environment, conservation, health and safety, and energy, produc-
ing a novel situation in which state and local governments served as both the objects of
and, frequently, the implementors of federal regulations. 3 Administratively, intergovern-
mental management in many of the new program areas assumed a cooptive, intrusive, and
sometimes arbitrary tone on the part of federal grant and regulatory administrators and a
confrontational, if not conniving, behavior on the part of many of the involved subnational
recipient governmental personnel.
By the late seventies, the system had become highly centralized in terms of policy-
making, yet was still largely noncentralized in terms of actual implementation. The latter
gave rise to the impression in the minds of many that no basic change had occurred in the
system. Yet, crucial interlevel changes had occurred, probably the most drastic in this
century. Critics of these developments focused on the national policy process, its heavy
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interest-group basis in the seventies, its prolific and ultimately costly policy outputs, and
its panoramic pattern of implementation involving at least 60,000 of the 82,000 units of
subnational governments and countless thousands of nonprofits. 4 Questions of systemic
overload, administrative effectiveness, economic efficiency, basic equity, and account-
ability—both politically and administratively—were raised by most conservatives and
many liberals.
At the same time, between 1960 and 1980, the poverty percentage was cut in half, and
the gap between the economically stronger and weaker did not widen (as it might well
have, given the massive influx of new job applicants from the baby-boom generation).
Thirty million members were added to the national work force, in part because of the
federally stimulated expansion of the state/local governmental sector, Social Security
amendments that encouraged early retirement, and some, but not all, of the federal jobs
programs and expanded educational opportunities. 5 Longer life expectancy and lower
child mortality rates were achieved, and a necessary revolution was achieved in civil
rights and civil liberties.
The Reagan election in 1980, to a certain degree, was a reaction to these earlier expan-
sionist policy developments at the national level. The advent of a national policy process
dominated by interest groups; of an ever centralizing national judiciary; and of a near
collapse of the national political parties, especially the ostensibly majority Democratic
Party, as effective brokers, mediators, and conciliators of factions in national conventions
and in Congress (thanks to populist reforms in both, in the early seventies) had given rise
to a collapse of various traditional policy constraints and to a national domestic agenda
that was overarching in its reach and centralizing in its basic policy thrusts. From a prag-
matic perspective, the overall system was seen as overloaded, ineffective administratively,
inefficient economically, not sufficiently targeted on equity goals, and basically unac-
countable politically. 6 To put it more simply, the federal system had become dysfunc-
tional—out of balance operationally. 7 Reagan federalism then constituted a rejection of
all of these trends. But how did it fare in practice?
To arrive at well-founded judgments regarding the impact(s) of Reagan federalism
requires some awareness of the varying vantage points from which intergovernmental
developments since 1981 might be observed and assessed. At least four such perspectives
come to mind: time; the president's overall agenda; nonpresidential key players; and state/
local governments.
The Time Factor
Time constitutes a basic conditioner of how one assesses Reagan federalism. Back in
1980, for example, few Washington observers felt that significant shifts in the system
were possible. Efforts to devolve, decentralize, and curb the national government's do-
mestic agenda were generally viewed skeptically, given the heavily centralizing and ex-
pansionist tendencies then of the national policy process, dominated by interest groups, as
noted above. Yet, in the fall of 1981, just one year later, the chances for some real surgery
on the system seemed not only possible, but inevitable. The two historic legislative wins
for the president and his economic policies were the crucial intervening factors here. With
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), outlays for domestic programs
were reduced by $35 billion for FY 1982 and by up to $131 billion for FY 1984, and
grants for state and local governments were slashed even more severely. To complement
this cut in federal expenditures, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) reduced
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individual income tax rates by 25 percent over a three-year period. These cuts, along with
incentives for personal savings and corporate investment, lowered federal revenues $282
billion below what they would have been for 1982-84. 8 These Reaganomics victories
combined to suggest a future scenario of severe further cuts in federal grants, draconian
reductions in the federal government's overall domestic role, rapid rises in defense and
foreign policy outlays, and real rollbacks in federal revenues. A range of domestic pro-
grams and the groups supporting them, along with the intergovernmental lobby, faced the
prospect of far more punishing actions in the years ahead than they had encountered in
1981.
From the vantage point of 1987, of course, this hairshirt horror show did not material-
ize. Beginning in FY 1983, grant outlays gradually increased both in constant and current
dollar terms, though the annual rate of increase for FY 1983-FY 1987 nowhere matched
its counterpart of the mid-1970s, and, as a percentage of state-local receipts from own
sources, federal aid totals declined from 31.7 percent in 1980 to 21.4 percent by 1986. 9 In
addition, while the number of programs by 1984 was reduced to around 400 (from 537 in
1980), there was no wholesale withdrawal from any of the major newly entered into and
later expanded program areas of the Johnson-Nixon-Ford years— save for some in the
areas of housing and multistate and substate regional development.
The mounting budget deficits and the doubling of the national debt since 1980 appeared
to set the scene by the mid-eighties for a rerun ofOBRA. Put differently, by 1985, the
huge revenue losses caused by ERTA, the extraordinary jumps in defense outlays during
Reagan's first term, the failure of Congress to cut domestic outlays as drastically as
OBRA or the president called for, and the Reagan opposition to meaningful "revenue
enhancements" (though he did sign three revenue-raising measures between 1982 and
1984) had created a political climate in which drastic action on the deficit seemed
necessary.
With the enactment of Gramm-Rudman (RL. 99-177) in 1985, some saw another draco-
nian drama about to unfold for domestic programs and for state and local governments.
Yet, with its thirteen "protected or semi-protected" safety net programs, 10 the even shar-
ing— if sequestrations are required—of the fiscal pain between defense and the remaining
domestic programs, the near consensus in Congress that domestic programs should expe-
rience only modest further cuts and that some tax hike was needed to avoid such cuts,
suggested at the outset that this would not be acted out. For FY 1986 and FY 1987, Con-
gress ostensibly adhered to the deficit-reduction target goals set forth in the act. Yet, the
ultimate actual shortfalls were greater than Congress had stipulated. For FY 1988, no
serious effort was made by either Congress or the president to reach the $108 billion
deficit target.
The crumbling of Gramm-Rudman's original goals is the ultimate result of the presi-
dent's failure to approve a tax hike and Congress's refusal to accept the severe domestic
program cuts called for by the White House. From the perspective of 1987, then, Reagan
federalism achieved more than could have been expected in 1980 but nowhere near what
was anticipated in late 1981, thanks to the resurgence of effective lobbying by program-
matic and other domestic-interest groups, the reemergence of congressional assertive-
ness, and the concomitant not-so-obvious decline in presidential domestic leadership.
Presidential Precepts
Another way to evaluate Reagan federalism is to assess its position and power in the presi-
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dent's overall constellation of concepts and commitments. The political creed of this pres-
ident, after all, has influenced the actions of this administration to a greater degree than
that of most other recent presidents; hence, it deserves some scrutiny. Moreover, and
again in contrast to most of his immediate predecessors, this president's philosophy ap-
pears clear, coherent, and internally consistent. On closer examination, however, the
separate precepts that constitute his personal political creed are not all that compatible or
mutually complementary. 11 Witness the disjuncture and discord present in the interplay of
his defense and foreign policy stands; his pro-business concerns; his Moral Majority
commitments; his domestic retrenchment goals; his basic economic objectives; his per-
sonal pragmatism; and his faith in the need for a more balanced, less centralized federal
system. The following brief analyses of each of these, save the last, will show that actions
and trends generated by efforts to carry them out have achieved far more centripetal
results than his federalist creed has produced centrifugal consequences.
Defense Buildup
A strong defense and an assertive foreign policy have been prominent features of the pres-
ident's basic belief system for some time. Once he had been elected, a major acceleration
of the defense buildup that had begun during Carter's last two years was launched. This
form of national governmental activism, combined with the extraordinary tax cuts sanc-
tioned by ERTA, put the squeeze on many domestic programs and helped trigger the dou-
bling of the national debt over the past six years. None of the defense-related actions
impacted federalism directly, but the fallout from mounting defense dollars in constant
dollar terms through FY 1986, far fewer tax dollars, and far greater debt payments, along
with a severe recession in 1982-83, certainly affected state and local governments and
congressional behavior to a far greater degree than Reagan federalism initiatives as such.
The president's defense policies, then, combined with his no-new-taxes stance and the
reluctance of Congress to cut deeply further into domestic programs, have produced the
largest budgets in our national fiscal history; a series of annual budgetary stalemates
resulting in extraordinary deficits; a static evolution in constant dollar terms for most
federal grants-in-aid, but not for Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid; and increased
state and local lobbying involvement in the national budget process. These four outcomes
together have undercut the president's federalist goals of reduced governmental activism
and a major shrinking in the size of the federal role in the federal system, as well as his
1980 economic goal of a balanced budget by 1984. A new centralizing dynamic is a by-
product of these interrelated developments.
Business Concerns
The state regulatory and international competitive worries of U.S. business have resulted
in other centripetal actions. Witness the many recent centralizing and preemptive actions
by Congress, the federal courts, and the federal executive branch, taken largely at the
behest of business interests, that is, efforts to enact a national product liability law; to
preempt varying state restrictions on truck length, width, and weight and to establish
uniform requirements; to raise the speed limit; to accelerate offshore oil and gas explora-
tion; and to speed up the production of nuclear power. Many of these have ended (or
would have ended if successful—product liability legislation, accelerated offshore oil
exploration, speeded up nuclear power production) what arguably are legitimate exercises
of states' police powers. Business rights, or at least those of the titans of interstate and
international trade, then rarely dovetail today with states' rights; the administration has
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not been unmindful of this distinction, and in the various areas cited above, it has favored
the centralizing positions of business. In terms of the president's federalism precepts, a
reduced federal role, deregulation, less activism, and devolution of program responsibili-
ties were all undermined when these pro-business initiatives were successful. Moreover,
even when they failed (for example, the offshore exploration and nuclear-power expan-
sion), the administration's efforts and rhetoric made a mockery, in state and local eyes, of
its concern for federalism.
Moral Majority Goals
The administration's support for certain goals of the Moral Majority also has conflicted
with the president's federalism precepts. The high-priority items on the Moral Majority's
agenda ("pro-life," prayer, anti-pornography, "family values," and so on) all involve
utilizing national governmental actions (a court decision, a statute, or an administrative
regulation or rule) to help achieve them. The religious right, unlike the fundamentalists of
a generation ago, ignores the separation ofchurch and state and eagerly seeks out the politi-
cal and governmental arena(s), especially those in Washington, to promote its programs.
While the president has skillfully managed to stave off making the Moral Majority's full
agenda his own, the administration has responded to this constituency with powerful rhet-
oric and even with a few positive programs (the regulations that produced the Baby Doe
case, the "teenage chastity" categorical grant, anti-abortion regulations, some judicial
appointments, and efforts to give tax-exempt status to segregated denominational
schools). 12 The noncentralizing, pluralistic values of federalism, especially Reagan feder-
alism, have not blended well with the moral certainties and the centralizing political
thrusts of the religious right.
Retrenchment Versus Deregulation
The administration's domestic retrenchment goals constitute yet another area wherein its
federalist values have been undercut. Efforts to rein in the mounting cost of Medicaid,
food stamps, and AFDC generated congressional (with OBRA) and administration
actions, beginning in 1981, that produced an increase in constraining rules and regula-
tions for recipient state governments. 13 Later administration endeavors, though unsuccess-
ful, to mandate Workfare requirements for three-quarters of all AFDC and food stamp
recipients would have produced a similar result. These were and are in marked contrast to
the administration's goals of curbing other intergovernmental regulations and of adminis-
tering the new block grants in a highly permissive fashion.
Budgetary, Deficit, and Tax Objectives
In various ways, the administration's goals in these related areas also have overridden
directly or indirectly state and local concerns, as the earlier discussion of its defense poli-
cies suggested. The high federal taxes, soaring federal domestic expenditures, rising
levels of federal borrowing, and increasing regulation of the seventies were viewed by
candidate Reagan in 1980 as developments that impeded business initiatives, greater pro-
ductivity and competitiveness, and private investment— in short, dynamic economic
growth. The Reagan election formula for an economic resurgence was comprised of much
lower taxes, significantly reduced domestic outlays, deregulation, and a balanced budget
(by 1984).
The dramatic budgetary and revenue responses to this problem of economic growth
were OBRA and ERTA. With the president's initial 1981 budget proposals for FY 1982,
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intergovernmental programs bore two-thirds of the $48.6 billion in domestic cuts that
were called for. Though OBRA provided for only a $35 billion reduction in domestic
spending (but $131 billion by FY 1984), grants-in-aid experienced far deeper slashes than
did other domestic programs, thanks in part to Social Security and a range of private sec-
tor subsidies being left largely intact. In addition, the much advertised nine block grants
incorporated in OBRA, while helpful administratively to their state recipients, amounted
to a 25 percent reduction from what the seventy-seven programs that were merged had
received in FY 1981. As will be explained later, real spending for federal grants to state
and local governments fell by only 8 percent for the period FY 1981-FY 1985, and this
reflected primarily both OBRA's severe impact and the modest growth in total grant out-
lays after FY 1982 (which the administration opposed).
As was noted earlier, ERTA was just as important to achieving the administration's
supply side economic policy goals. With its 25 percent reduction in individual income-tax
rates over three years and numerous corporate tax breaks, about $282 billion in revenues
was lost to the Treasury between 1982 and 1984. In combination, these two enactments set
the scene for a much constrained national-policy development process (in terms of domes-
tic program growth and new domestic initiatives).
Some of the lost revenues were recaptured with the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibil-
ity Act of 1982 (TEFRA) and the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA), along with the
Social Security bailout and the Surface Transportation Act of 1982. The revenue-neutral
nature of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 did nothing to help solve this problem, though it did
eliminate the deductibility of state and local sales taxes and personal property levies.
These later enactments could in no way compensate for the heavy growth in outlays for
defense and Social Security and the moderate hike in domestic expenditures; hence, the
soaring deficit challenge and the rapid rise in debt payments in the mid-eighties.
The combined effects of these national budgetary, taxing, and deficit-increase actions
have been to reduce somewhat the federal role in domestic affairs—to a far greater degree
than the administration's federalism initiatives as such; to curb the expansionist policy
development process that prevailed from 1964 to 1978; to force state and local govern-
ments to rely far less on national solutions to some of their problems (which they have
done); and to defeat the administration's (and others') goals of a balanced budget, less
overall governmental activism, and a healthy balance of foreign trade. Moreover, despite
its constraining character, this overriding fiscal development has exerted a centralizing
effect in the sense that no state or local government can ignore its many direct and indirect
economic and intergovernmental consequences.
Personal Pragmatism
Finally, the president's political pragmatism and personal reluctance to adhere rigidly to
disruptive ideological goals also must be considered here. For example, while the presi-
dent has conveyed convincingly the continuing impression that he opposes tax hikes, the
record indicates that he has signed at least four revenue-raising measures since 1982:
TEFRA; the Social Security Act Amendments of 1983 (P.L. 98-21: the "bailout"); the
Surface Transportation Act of 1982; and DEFRA. Additionally, while Congress enacted
appropriations bills from 1982 to 1986 that exceeded his budget requests for federal aid to
states and localities, the president signed these measures apparently without major dis-
comfort in most instances, though some had been reduced under the threat of veto. These
and other case studies suggest that the president's pragmatism and dislike of sustained
confrontational politics sometimes have served to blunt his strong ideological commit-
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ments. 14 At times, this has meant a slowing of his drive to devolve powers and responsibil-
ities to the states. At other times, it has meant a willingness to favor more powerful
pressure groups (business, populist, or Moral Majority), and sometimes this has undercut
state and local prerogatives.
A More Balanced Federalism: A Wavering Goal
To sum up, federalism is one—but only one—of the tenets in the president's political
creed, and it frequently conflicts with and is undercut by other tenets. In operational
terms, it is much more important than so-called Moral Majority issues, but it nowhere
matches the business, economic, defense, and political pragmatic concerns of the presi-
dent and his administration. Reagan federalism's chief legislative wins occurred in 1981,
notably with OBRA, though its pro-state and local administrative actions have continued
to the present. His second State of the Union and its near total preoccupation with the
grand restructuring of the federal system produced a tough and troubling debate between
governors and administration spokesmen throughout most of 1982, but no agreement or
constructive legacy.
Every Budget Message since then has called for grant consolidations and cutbacks in
domestic programs in order to help promote the administration's ostensible prime domes-
tic goals of federal retrenchment and devolution. Yet Congress has ignored practically all
of the various post- 1981 block-grant recommendations and has rejected many of the pro-
posed program cuts and eliminations, partially because White House lobbyists did not
push vigorously for them and partially because most of the members felt that the limit had
been reached with OBRA.
In short, the president's early crusade for a more constrained federal role in the federal
system frequently was shunted aside, even when the president seemed in political ascen-
dancy, by other more commanding issues and challenges. This by no means is intended to
suggest that his desire to rebalance the federal system has disappeared or that it was never
deep. Too many other executive branch actions after 1981 that favored states and their
localities (that is, in the grants management, block grant, and some regulatory areas) can
be cited to demonstrate a continuing federalism focus. But the overall record does signify
his stronger concern with defense, foreign affairs, domestic retrenchment, and business
worries, and it demonstrates that the unfolding of actual events over the past seven years,
along with his pragmatism, have only accentuated his preoccupations with these kinds of
issues. Federalism no longer is the bright star it was in 1981-82 within the constellation of
Reagan concepts, but it is still one of the stars.
Key Players, Power Positions, and Models
Another angle from which to view the recent intergovernmental record and to arrive at
judgments on it is quite opposite to this presidential one. Pluralist interpretations of the
American system usually contend that the personal philosophy (if such it can be called) of
a president—even a popular and persuasive one, like Reagan— is but one factor condition-
ing policy developments in a system as richly variegated, as frequently constraining, and
as accessible as ours. Hence, it behooves the careful analyst to gauge the changing com-
parative power positions of the numerous actors in the recent national decision process
and to probe the related phenomenon of which of the historic models of policy-making
predominated during the period 1981-87. 15
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Presidential Government (1981)
From January 20, 1981, through the rest of that year, the president and the presidency
were in ascendancy. Thanks to Reagan's appeal, his electoral triumph, the unexpected
Republican capture of the Senate (for the first time since 1952), the carving out of an
ideological conservative majority in the nominally Democratic House, the general Demo-
cratic disarray— politically and ideologically—and popular expectations of change, the
specter from the 1970s of a near impotent presidency faded, and fairly rapidly at that.
The historic model of policy-making for this relatively brief period was the Hamilto-
nian-crafted, hierarchic, presidentially centered and ascendant one—the first time the
nation had observed such a phenomenon since the tumultuous years of Lyndon Baines
Johnson, the Great Society, and the extraordinary 89th Congress. This is not to say that
the president or his allies totally dominated policy-making. Even in this prolonged presi-
dential honeymoon period, the White House did not get exactly what it wanted in all in-
stances. Witness how little the nine block grants that emerged within the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act resembled what the president's initial seven called for.
All in all, however, few would deny that 1981 was a year of strong presidential leader-
ship—both in foreign and domestic affairs. From the intergovernmental angle, the only
major legislative victories the administration has scored in this area occurred in that year:
the one-time rollback of federal-aid expenditures (by more than $8 billion); the elimina-
tion of some sixty-odd programs—including most of the federal-multistate economic
development and river basin commissions programs, the Intergovernmental Personnel
Act, and a number of substate regional programs and incentives; the enactment of nine
block grants that involved the merger of some seventy-seven aid programs; and the tight-
ening of eligibility and other requirements for AFDC and Medicaid. These all were
achieved in 1981, primarily through skillful manipulation on the part of the executive
branch (David Stockman in particular) of the congressional budget process for presiden-
tial policy purposes and for circumventing the hostile House Hierarchs and dozens of
liberal and other program lobbyists (but few private-sector subsidy advocates). This feat
was not to be repeated in subsequent years.
A Pluralistic Policy Process (1982-87)
The second and third Reagan years witnessed the reemergence of a nonsupine Congress
and the passage of legislation such as TEFRA, the Surface Transportation Act of 1982,
and the Social Security bailout, all crafted primarily by congressional leaders. The con-
tinuation of an absolute decline in federal aid, as OBRA mandated, did not occur. Instead,
aid totals in FY 1983 increased by more than $4 billion over the FY 1982 low-level mark,
and continued to grow to the point in FY 1986 where they exceeded $1 12 billion. More-
over, in these years the president's budget requests for state and local aid ranged from $4
billion to $13 billion below what he ultimately signed into law. Presidential defense re-
quests increasingly encountered the opposite treatment, to the point where Congress, for
both FY 1986 and FY 1987, actually held the defense budget to a steady level in constant
dollars. Yet the bigger intergovernmental issue here is the relative position of federal aid,
and this position has been and is a reduced one in terms of overall budget expenditures and
domestic outlays. Moreover, federal aid declined steadily from FY 1980 (30.4 percent) to
FY 1986 (20.6 percent) as a proportion of state-local general revenues, reflecting both
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What this post- 1981, mixed pattern of presidential and congressional initiatives and
rebuffs suggests is a more significant role for Congress and domestic-interest groups in
national domestic policy-making and a curbing of the president's first-year, nearly unfet-
tered influence. This can be partially explained by the Democratic pickup of seats in 1982
(putting the Speaker back into clear control of the House) and by the failure of the Repub-
licans to capture the necessary 25 to 30 seats in 1984 that would have permitted a return to
the earlier conservative coalition control. Yet, more is involved here than party and elec-
toral political shifts. The slackening off of congressional compliance with presidential
wishes began, after all, in 1982 (if not with the Supplemental Appropriation late in 1981),
and this means that attitudes and votes on various domestic programs and on cuts changed
midstream for many members of the 97th Congress, though all within the constrained
fiscal climate generated by OBRA, TEFRA, and the hikes in defense.
The severe recession of 1982-83, the growing bipartisan congressional consensus on
domestic program renewals (but not on appropriate funding levels), and the marked in-
crease in successful lobbying activity (much of it by members of the intergovernmental
group, as with the Surface Transportation Act, 17 the renewal ofGRS in 1983, and the
maintenance intact of both the Community Development Block Grant and the Urban Di-
rect Action Grant) combined, beginning in 1982, to help scrap the OBRA scenario of
further drastic cuts in federal aid. This development, when combined with the skyrocket-
ing defense, Social Security, and Medicare outlays, explains the massive budget deficits of
the Reagan years. All these program expansions also underscore the emergence of a heavi-
ly pluralistic, partially pressure-group conditioned, mildly expansionist decision-making
process in the domestic program area.
While somewhat differently constituted and much more deficit conscious than its sister
of the seventies, this system was and is, in terms of overall expenditure, as "out of hand"
as its predecessor ever was, producing far larger budgets and far bigger deficits in 1982-
87. It involved as many key actors, internal and external, as did the short-lived 1981 pro-
cess— if not more—but fewer than that of the prior decade. This relative reduction in the
number of players was not from a lack of eager potential players but stemmed from the
emergence of a few pieces— sometimes only one piece—of massive omnibus legislation in
any one session as the focal point of congressional, presidential, and pressure group atten-
tion and action. The prime legislative players in this procedurally circumscribed setting
were and are the six money committees of the Congress. For the first time in living mem-
ory, the authorizing (substantive) committees and their members were relegated largely to
a secondary role.
Programmatic By-products
This latest version of the Madisonian pluralistic, pressure-group conditioned, conces-
sional model of policy-making helped produce the most critical peacetime deficit crisis
ever. Yet it also produced a very different version of federalism than the one reflected in
the president's 1981 goals of reducing federal aid, delegating federal grant programs,
ending or curbing federal intergovernmental regulation, and eliminating federal multi-
state and substate regional initiatives. Implicit in the combined actions of the president
and the Congress from 1982 to 1987 was an approximation of a theory of federalism that
did not forsake all the concerns of congressional federalism of the seventies. 18
The earlier incrementalism was replaced in part by a combined decremental/incremen-
tal approach wherein some programs, usually small and not too important, were elimi-
nated; the larger and more popular ones were continued, sometimes with funding hikes;
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and the rest were renewed but at static funding levels. Dramatic program initiatives in any
direction were generally resisted after 1981, though 1987 witnessed proposals for welfare
reform, catastrophic illness coverage, worker retraining, and aid for the homeless, either
from the president or Congress, or both.
The confrontational character of Congress's earlier approach to federalism reemerged
wholly intact in 1982 and grew stronger as time elapsed. The administration's calls for
ever deeper domestic and, especially, intergovernmental program cuts were simply re-
jected. The procurement practices of defense came under heavy bipartisan fire, and the
growing number of those in poverty became known and a cause of some alarm. 19 Congress
for six years now has in almost wholesale fashion rejected the president's budgets, even as
a point of departure for debate on most items, though his target figure for overall spending
always has been honored until now, or even cut a bit. This growing congressional indepen-
dence and leadership have worked generally to sustain federal aid programs in some
form, to maintain a fairly expansive federal-program agenda ("deficit politics" permit-
ting), to assume a more empathetic stance than that of the president regarding state and
local worries, and to treat most federal political executives with considerable skepticism,
if not scorn.
Congress's habitual preference for narrowly defined and heavily conditional categori-
cals also continues to manifest itself. 20 The decline in the number of categoricals by 1982
to less than 400 from an all-time high of 534 in 1980, along with the advent of 13 block
grants (12 of them new), would seem to conflict with Congress's predilection for categori-
cal grants and the conditions attached to them; on the face of it, this would appear to be
the case. However, note that nearly all the major categoricals of the Johnson-Nixon period
are still operational (save for the regional and some of the housing programs), that the
categorical proportion of federal aid was larger in FY 1986 (81.4 percent) than it was in
Carter's last year (79.3 percent),
21 and that general revenue sharing was terminated in
1986. Not to be overlooked are various signs of congressional skepticism regarding ef-
forts by the administration to loosen categorical conditions, or signs of congressional
willingness to slap on additional regulations and directives. 22
This current congressional approach to intergovernmental relations—and it began well
before the Democratic recapturing of the Congress in 1986—clearly contrasts with the
approach of the administration. Since both approaches are being partially applied, some
confusion about the future course of the system inevitably arises—a dilemma that fre-
quently occurs when the predominant operational model is a Madisonian pluralistic one.
The Outlook from Below
Yet another position from which to view and assess current intergovernmental develop-
ments is that of state and local governments. Reagan federalism's greatest impact on these
partners in the system has been an attitudinal one. In fact, if there has been any truly revo-
lutionary dimension to its impact, it has been the shift in state and local attitudes. No
longer do their officials rely on the national government to assist in, if not actually solve,
many of their toughest challenges. Instead, they now rely more on self-help and other
forms of intergovernmental collaboration, while not ignoring the continuing financial,
regulatory, programmatic, and legal roles that Washington continues to assume.
In more specific terms, state and local officials have found the following to be true:
1. Thus far, the cuts in federal aid for most of their jurisdictions have not been
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all that severe, but cities and counties that relied heavily on such aid (as of
1980) have experienced disproportionately heavy rollbacks, and the overall
10 percent drop in federal aid's proportion of state-local receipts from
1980 to 1986 has confronted many jurisdictions with some fiscal head-
aches.
2. While federal deregulation efforts have been helpful in the developmental
and block grant areas, they have been less apparent to state officials in
welfare and other social categorical programs, 23 and Congress and the
Court seem still to march to the drum of "continue the conditions."
3. Where devolution of program administration has occurred, most states
have picked up the responsibility one way or another; witness their gener-
ally good-to-excellent handling of the new block grants; their assumption
(save for two) of the substate regional supervisory role under Executive
Order 12372; their extra funding of certain aid programs that experienced
federal cuts; and their continuation of some of the multistate regional
undertakings without Washington's participation. 24
4. Despite the strong preference for an exclusive federal-state partnership in
Reagan federalism, and despite the singular reliance on the states as imple-
mentors of all the new block grants, the "bypassing" of state governments
continues at only a slightly reduced rate, having dropped from 23.1 per-
cent in 1980 to 21.6 percent in 1984. The elimination of general revenue
sharing, however, will cut the bypassing figures for 1987. The 1981-85
direct federal aid to localities provided some psychic comfort to cities and
counties, though it undercut the president's own recipient preferences and
was a source of some irritation to some state officials.
5. Those hit hardest by the cuts of 1981 and some later ones were the "work-
ing poor," nonprofit organizations in the social services and related areas,
and those urban and rural general units of government which have servic-
ing overburdens and revenue shortfalls. 25
6. The recession of 1982-83, those national actions which helped deepen it,
and the later deficit crisis, most state and local officials would agree, af-
fected states and many localities far more heavily than did Reagan federal-
ism; furthermore, various federal court decisions have had as much of an
impact (usually negative and especially on the nation's localities) as the
president's intergovernmental initiatives.
7. Finally, Gramm-Rudman's scenario (RL. 99-177) of exempting thirteen
"safety net" programs from any automatic cuts 26 and of equally sharing
any required rollbacks between defense and the remaining domestic pro-
grams is one that most state-local officials prefer to the "dig deep into the
domestics" alternative contained in all of the president's recent budgets.
Most of these state and local impacts, responses, actions, and anxieties relate directly to
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the fallout from Reagan's intergovernmental policies, but others stem from his (and oth-
ers') budgetary and revenue stands. Equally significant in any assessment of these juris-
dictions' perspectives on recent federal intergovernmental and other actions are their
indirect effects on subnational governments. In general, these effects have tended to
strengthen and even accelerate continuing state-local trends.
A major indirect consequence of Washington's downplaying of its intergovernmental
role, for example, has been further enhancement of the states' pivotal functional role in
the overall system. Thanks to diverse federal actions that began in the sixties, the states
during the seventies took on the vital roles of chief planner, actual administrator, and
major implementor of nearly all the major federal domestic programs and intergovern-
mental regulatory policies enacted in the pre-Reagan period. The net effect of federal
cutbacks, deregulation, program eliminations, the drag of the deficit on policy growth,
and certain court cases (notably those related to municipal antitrust and tort liability), and
of local and popular reactions to these and other threatening challenges, has been to ex-
pand the states' operational role in the system during the eighties. In the areas of the envi-
ronment, education reform and finance, economic development (including foreign trade),
physical infrastructure, and aid to local government, most states assumed significantly
greater responsibilities.
By 1980, the states also had again become significant sources of new policy initiatives
in their own right (for example, consumer protection, educational finance and reform,
health-cost controls, economic development, and so on). The remarkable renaissance of
this historic state role was prompted by a combination of local pressures; various of the
earlier federal actions cited above; the transformation of state political systems, which has
rendered them far more accessible and responsive; and the advent generally, but not uni-
formly, of much stronger state finances. All these dynamics of change served to revive the
states' traditional function of serving as a prime arena in which their respective citizenries
could express some of their policy preferences in a range of key areas.
The range of these areas clearly has narrowed during the past half century. Yet state
political processes have never been more open, and state electorates have never been more
inclusive. These political changes (triggered largely by federal actions, chiefly the Voting
Rights Act of 1966 and the reapportionment decisions of 1962 and 1965) and the still
significant scope of the states' police, fiscal, and other powers help explain the revitaliza-
tion of the states' policy-making role. They also suggest that this is no transitory phenom-
enon, and the states' policy actions, both in response to and wholly independent of Reagan
federalism policies and the national government's deficit difficulties, only confirm this
suggestion.
By 1980, then, the states were performing two fundamental functions—they were serv-
ing as the system's prime middleman manager and as an arena (not the arena) in which
their differentiated citizenries could register their policy preferences and prompt novel
initiatives. During the subsequent seven years, the states' individual and collective vigor
in performing both these roles were to stand the system in good stead. Capacity in and
concern with both roles were needed, after all, to cope with OBRA and ERTA; the reces-
sion of 1982-83; static federal aid growth; some formal and some informal devolutions;
the specter of Gramm-Rudman; and the constrained national policy climate generated by
"deficit politics." Some would say it was providential that the states were prepared by
1981 to take on the challenges of this decade.
Another side effect of Reagan federalism has been the acceleration of certain earlier
local governmental trends and the occasional triggering of some new ones. Among the
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former is the increasing willingness on the part of cities and counties to rely on various
interlocal collaborative approaches to providing services—joint powers agreements,
interlocal contracts, and transfers of functions. The seventies witnessed a steady increase
in the use of these devices, and the early eighties have seen an even greater reliance on
them as a means of overcoming interlocal jurisdictional fragmentation and of providing a
service more cheaply. 27 A long-term local governmental trend—the increasing use of
special districts and authorities for rendering public services—also has been enhanced by
these districts' proven capacity to provide services that transcend local boundaries and by
their appeal in the eighties to those (including the administration) who want more services
funded on a "user charge" basis. 28
A new development in local government is the different role of and changing attitudes
toward areawide Councils of Governments (COGs), comprised chiefly of elected local
office-holders.
29 As a result of partial federal withdrawal from the substate regional
scene, COGs were forced to rethink their functions, and their local constituents were
forced to reassess their earlier, frequently skeptical attitudes. Out of this came more local
fiscal support and a new mix ofCOG activities. Clearinghouse efforts continued, but
more COGs participated in interlocal servicing contracts and even in acting as recipients
of functional transfers, all in a general spirit of greater entrepreneurialism and of state-
local reliance.
30 Another new, but by no means major, trend in local government is the
willingness—especially in the eighties—of more localities to rely on private-sector provi-
sion of a public function. Of the many approaches, contracts have been the most favored
device, followed by franchises. 31 And while these private-sector alternatives nowhere
match the popularity of the interlocal governmental options, what evidence there is indi-
cates an increase in their usage in the eighties. This growing willingness to experiment
with a variety of indirect approaches to the provision of services suggests a degree of
flexibility among local government officials that few would have deemed possible even
ten years ago.
The whole realm of state-local relations is, of course, a third and final subnational gov-
ernmental area wherein the indirect effects of recent Washington intergovernmental and
other policy actions have manifested themselves. Even in the above primarily local
spheres of action, permissive state legislation is required, and, when it is not granted,
such local initiatives generally are barred. In this primary arena of intergovernmental
relations, many earlier trends also were strengthened and a few new ones began to emerge
in the eighties.
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The themes of this revitalized state-local partnership were and are greater interdepen-
dence, more assertive state leadership, and a greater centralization of policy-making.
Beginning in the late sixties and continuing through the seventies to now, states have
moved to accomplish the following:
1. Facilitate interlocal and other servicing shifts (especially transfers of func-
tions, local-private servicing contracts, and state pickup of nonfederal
responsibilities in welfare programs).
2. Broaden somewhat the revenue bases of local governments, with twenty-
nine states now authorizing local sales taxes and thirteen, income levies for
certain localities, along with thirty-one sanctioning local tax increment
financing (compared to twenty in 1980).
34
3. Establish enterprise zone programs in nearly twenty-five states, chiefly
for the benefit of distressed communities.
4. Increase and better target the funding of primary and secondary educa-
tion.
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5. Provide for reimbursement of state mandates (now required in nineteen
states, with nearly half of these acting in the eighties).
6. Improve, through a variety of ways, access of localities to credit markets,
with some twenty-six states enacting such measures between 1980 and
1983. 34
These and other state initiatives have helped to make state-local relations "more inten-
sive, more interdependent, and more involved" than they have ever been. 35 They also have
rendered these relations more constructive and more genuinely collaborative, though with
some greater centralization in many instances. Despite these generally positive develop-
ments, current state-local relations are not without conflict and contention. Were these
absent, nirvana indeed would have arrived at the subnational governmental levels! The
recent decline in noneducational state aid, the still predominant position of property taxes
in most local revenue packages, the continuing presence of local tax and expenditure lids
(in thirty-nine states), and the failure of most states to assist their localities on either the
municipal antitrust or tort liability front are but a few of the foremost items of unfinished
state business on the agendas of many municipal leagues and county associations.
At the same time, from the state viewpoint some of these actions reflect or are condi-
tioned by various statewide policy concerns stemming from their more activist stance as
revenue raisers, policy innovators, financiers, regulators, and implementors of their own
as well as federal programs. A more genuine state-local partnership, then, has emerged in
the eighties—thanks in part to some of the side effects of Washington's recent intergovern-
mental initiatives, and deficit difficulties. This development is not a new one, but rather a
strengthening of a firm trend that dates back at least to the sixties. In this revitalized col-
laboration, there are still elements of some conflict and, quite clearly, some tendencies to
centralize certain policy decisions at the state level.
Current Conclusions
Having probed Reagan federalism and its impacts from the perspectives of varying recent
periods of time, its place in the president's personal philosophy and the administration's
action agenda, its treatment by other key actors in the national policy process, and its
effect on state and local officials, we can now ask what conclusions can be drawn. Three
basic ones emerge from this analysis, as follows.
1. It can safely be stated that the Reagan years have produced some changes in the sys-
tem—notably, in more pessimistic attitudes and more modest expectations regarding the
capacity of the national government to maintain an expansive domestic role, and in the
increasing reliance of both the national and local governments on the states to shore up the
system. This does not mean there are no continuities with the past; too many signs exist
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nationally of linkages with the seventies, if not the sixties, to reach this conclusion— for
example, an assertive Congress, a still powerful array of generally centralizing interest
groups, and a no clearer idea now as to what the federal role is or should be in the federal
system than in 1980. The essential reasons for the basic changes, however, have more to
do with the fallout from Reaganomics (direct and indirect), the doubling of the national
debt since 1981, and the results of these developments, than with the president's or any-
body else's purely intergovernmental initiatives.
2. For some, the implications of the above inevitably lead to a more decentralized,
devolved system, in that a de facto shedding of national responsibilities is necessitated by
the stringent shape of the federal fisc. But does this follow? A focusing on federal aid
figures since 1981 might warrant this assertion, though even these indicate no rapid re-
treat from program area after program area. Moreover, when the heavily conditional
nature of aid, the still resilient strength of regulatory federalism, and the continuing pre-
emptive propensities of Congress (and centralizing thrust of the federal courts) are re-
called, any sweeping announcement of the advent of a new, decentralized federalism
would be greeted by state and local officials and by close observers of the Washington
scene with a hoot of derisive laughter. Nonetheless, the system today is somewhat less
centripetal than it was in 1980, thanks again (but only partially) to the more confined
policy process resulting from the national government's deficit dilemma and partially to
the expansion of the states' functional role in the system.
3. Following from the above, the system is a bit more balanced and somewhat more
functional today than it was in the seventies, when various authorities were trumpeting its
alleged interlevel imbalances and dysfunctionalities. This generalization requires some
explanation, since it involves the relative positions of power which the subnational govern-
ments now occupy in the system, compared to those of seven years or more ago. Balance
in a federal regime signifies roughly equal weight or power— in political, operational,
policy-making, and constitutional judicial terms— for the central and constituent govern-
ments. At the very least, it should signify a capacity on the part of the latter units to assert
by political, formal representational, operational and/or judicial means an authoritative
role in national governmental actions that affect their jurisdictional and operational integ-
rity, as in the West German federal system. There are three primary arenas then, where
balancing acts may or may not occur.
In the area of operationalfederalism (that is, the funding, managing, and actual imple-
mentation of intergovernmental programs), the national government's role is still strong,
but not as overarching as it was in 1980. Some of the signs of this are the slight reduction
in the length of its intergovernmental program agenda; the proportionate decline in its
fiscal contribution to the overall funding of aided programs; the slash in the number of
grant recipients—especially local ones; the loosening up of some conditions in some
intergovernmental program areas—notably the nonsocial; and for the block grant and
some environmental programs, a devolution of greater grant management responsibili-
ties. Another sign is the assumption by the subnational governments, especially the states,
of a somewhat greater operational role, in part as a result of the above and in part because
of their own greater fiscal efforts in many instances and independent new or expanded
policy initiatives (especially in the fields of education, the environment, the physical in-
frastructure, and consumer protection). These developments suggest a slight tilt in power
to the states, but not to the extent of seriously undercutting the national government's
policy ascendancy in a range of key programs and regulatory areas.
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In terms of operational effectiveness of the intergovernmental system, these federal
devolutionary and independent state initiatives have combined to produce some slackening
off in the level of its pre- 1981 dysfunctionality. After all, somewhat fewer conditions and
regulations, fewer partners, and even fewer aid dollars, in some cases, as well as more
independent subnational governmental actions and funding decisions, constitute a meas-
ure, albeit small, of interlevel decentralization and of some reduction in the system's ear-
lier programmatic, administrative, and fiscal overload.
In thejudicial/regulatory area, however, the federal government's authority seems only
to expand. Witness the generally centripetal thrust of most of the recent decisions relating
to the interstate commerce power (notably Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit:
105 S. Ct. 1005), the conditional spending power, and the reach of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Note also that there has been no real rollback in the aggressive intergovernmental
regulatory role of the national government. All three branches of the central government
have contributed to this development, and their regulatory as well as preemptive actions
have significantly compromised the subnational governments' discretion in the opera-
tional realm and even in areas that do not involve aid dollars.
In the third broad field wherein contemporary federalism is shaped—the political/
representational—no fundamental shifts have occurred over the past half dozen years to
warrant the assertion that the intergovernmental lobby is stronger in Washington, D.C.
,
than it was in the seventies or that, in national party deliberations, the role of elected state
and local officials has returned to the ascendant status that it possessed from the 1830s to
the mid-1960s. National party units for the first time in our history are as authoritative as
state and local ones, if not more so. 36 "Procedural reform and judicial intervention have
resulted ... in federalization, not hierarchical nationalization," explains one authority on
the Democrats. 37 The Republicans, according to Leon Epstein, "have nationalized their
party effort by a method analogous to the federal government's grant-in-aid system." 38
Thus, the balance of power between the national and state parties has shifted dramatically
away from the earlier, heavily decentralized party system. 39
At the same time, both the national and state/local parties have had to redefine their
roles in light of extraordinary changes in the political environment: technological, notably
in the communications and media fields; legal, with continued state and increasing fed-
eral regulation of party activities; attitudinal, that is, the severe decline in citizen commit-
ment to the parties and the marked increase in fractionalization of the body politic;
electoral, for example, fundamental shifts in campaign techniques, strategies, and fund-
ing; and representational, with the explosion in the number, types, and activities of pres-
sure groups.
40 Moreover, the parties have lost many of their earlier functions to the media,
pressure groups, PACs, private consultants, and pollsters. 41 In representational terms,
before Congress, national administrative bodies, and the Supreme Court, the states, local-
ities, and their spokespersons have— since the 1970s—been treated more like one more
category of interest group than as vital, functional governmental components of a consti-
tutional federal system. 42
From this three-factor approach to assessing interlevel power relations comes, then, the
final judgment that the system still is a nation-centered one, given its still strongly centrip-
etal thrusts in the judicial/regulatory and political/representational test areas. Yet, it is
somewhat less nation-centered than it was in 1980, because of the more ambivalent nature
of recent developments in the realm of actual operations. These latter developments also
provide the basis for the claim that the system overall is somewhat less dysfunctional than
it was in the seventies.
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The Future
What do these current conclusions suggest for the future of U.S. federalism? The present
system has been aptly dubbed by Michael D. Reagan as a "permissive federalism,"
whereby the "states' share" of power and authority "rests upon the permission and per-
missiveness of the national government." 43 This dominant permissive trait of contempo-
rary federalism, however, is an affront to most state and local officials and to defenders of
constitutional federalism. Hence, the tendency of such groups to ponder those current
developments which might lead to a more balanced intergovernmental system and to chart
possible future trends that would lead to a federalism that is more firmly rooted in genu-
ine interlevel cooperation, rather than unilateral national cooptations; in a more federally
(territorially) structured political system rather than a national interest-group dominated
one; and in Supreme Court decisions that provide parameters to the commerce and condi-
tional spending powers of Congress and that recognize the transformed characters of
today's states and localities— a transformation that the Court itself helped bring about.
Some observers, including the president, the attorney general, and various legal
scholars, see an evolving legal scenario that could help shore up the fragile foundations of
judicial federalism. By 1988, the president will have appointed over half the members of
the federal judiciary and, for the first time, will have a conservative majority on the Su-
preme Court. From this, according to the script, a series of decisions could over time
result which would provide greater constitutional protection to the constituent govern-
ments and their localities. However, the capacity of Supreme Court justices to evolve and
to change their earlier basic positions and the cluster of sometimes conflicting values
(federalism being one of them) which may comprise a juridically conservative creed stand
as two major notes of caution about future actions of such a Supreme Court.
Another future scenario is a continuation of the current national deficit drama, which
already is producing a "de facto federalism" involving a very gradual peeling off of some
federal domestic responsibilities to subnational governments and the private sector. 44
Cutting spending and programs, raising taxes, or doing both are still the basic national
policy options for those who seek to deal with this dilemma. Yet, if the economic conse-
quences here and abroad of the deficit are not understood any better in the future than
they are now, then the present charade of puny parings back and of major executive
branch-congressional confrontations over a pigmy revenue-raising package of $20 billion
will continue, and the currently constrained but not closed national policy process will
linger on. If future domestic and international economic conditions reflect more dramati-
cally and disastrously the dire consequences of our seemingly insatiable propensity na-
tionally to borrow big and blatantly, then a different, probably much more draconian
version of the deficit drama will be staged. Under either of these options, a reduced fed-
eral fiscal and programmatic role would result; with the second option, such a role proba-
bly would have severe, subnational governmental consequences in terms of added
operational responsibilities. But neither of these fiscal scenarios, it should be stressed,
would do anything to rein in the national government's interventionist regulatory and
judicial roles.
Both the judicial and fiscal scenarios hold promise of some measure of realization, but
the nationalization of the political process which occurred over the past twenty years and
the centralizing propensities of dominant interests in both the national parties are not
likely to be overturned in the years immediately ahead.
These conflicting forecasts, then, suggest that in overall systemic terms U.S. federalism
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for the rest of the century will probably be a little less nation-centered than it is now. They
do not indicate, however, that it will be a more cooperative federalism. Such a shift would
involve an authoritative state-local role in national policy-making and in operational mat-
ters, as well as a preferential jurisdictional standing in cases involving these jurisdictions
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